



HISTORY
ROUTE 2
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1 – THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT 1945–79

Friday 12 November 2010 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the outbreak of the Arab–Israeli Six Day War (1967).

SOURCE A *An extract from a speech to members of the Egyptian National Assembly by Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egyptian President, 29 May 1967.*

We are now ready to deal with the entire Palestine question. The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, or the withdrawal of the UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force), but the rights of the Palestine people. It is the aggression which took place in Palestine in 1948 with the collaboration of Britain and the United States. It is the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine, the denial of their rights, and the plunder [theft] of their property. It is the disavowal [ignoring] of all the UN resolutions in favour of the Palestinian people. If the United States and Britain are partial to Israel, we must say that our enemy is not only Israel but also the United States and Britain and treat them as such.

SOURCE B *Cartoon by Imad Melhem, © Alhayat newspaper issue # 6482 page 5, 31 May 1967. Reproduced with permission.*



Israel, represented by the Star of David, submits to the tanks of the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

SOURCE C

*An extract from **The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars**, Ritchie Ovendale, London, 1984. Ovendale was a lecturer in the Department of International Politics at University College, Aberystwyth, UK.*

Abba Eban [Israeli Foreign Minister] returned to Tel Aviv on 23 May 1967 and attended a meeting at the Ministry of Defence: it was reported that the Egyptians were not yet ready for a full offensive; Syria was retreating; there was no movement in Jordan. Yitzhak Rabin [Chief of Staff of Israeli Defence Forces] had told him that time was needed to reinforce the south: the diplomatic establishment could help with that. Eban advised the gathering that Israel must think like a nation whose soil had already been invaded; but Israel's predicament [problem] was international not regional and it had to look to the United States to neutralize the Russian menace. Johnson [US President] had asked to be consulted, and for forty-eight hours' respite. Most of those present agreed on the need for a political phase before a military reaction. Moshe Dayan [Israeli Defence Minister], however, favoured military action against Egypt after forty-eight hours on a battleground close to the Israeli border. It was agreed to mobilize the reservists.

SOURCE D

*An extract from **The Palestine–Israel Conflict**, Gregory Harms, London, 2005. Harms is a freelance writer and researcher.*

Reports began to come from Damascus that the Israelis were massing troops in heavy concentration along the Syrian border, poised for imminent attack. Russia “confirmed” these reports, which escalated the tension and placed Nasser on high alert; Egypt and Syria, at Russian request, signed a defense pact that would help protect Soviet objectives in the region. The reports of massing Israeli troops, however, were false. Later Syrian reconnaissance flights provided conclusive photos that revealed no such troop concentrations, and UN observers, too, confirmed the falsity of the claim. Though reasoning behind Russian behavior here is speculative, most assume that it feared an Israeli attack on Syria and thought a potential Egyptian response might encourage Israeli hesitation. Whether Nasser knew of the intelligence being bogus [false] or not, he began assembling troops in Sinai. Nasser's response is also an occasion for speculation, but the intent of polishing up his image probably was not far from his mind. And then he took it the extra step. To the shock of just about everyone, Nasser requested the UNEF to withdraw from the Egyptian border and Sinai, as was his legal right according to the agreement after the Suez Crisis.

SOURCE E

*An extract from **Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict**, Charles Smith, Boston, 2007. Smith is a Professor of History at the University of Arizona.*

A decisive factor was the news on June 2 that in response to American requests, Nasser had agreed to send his vice president, Zakariya Mohieddine, to Washington on June 7 to discuss measures to defuse the potential for confrontation over the Tiran blockade. This was totally unacceptable, even to Eban, who had resisted the military option until June 1: it was probable that this initiative would aim at a face-saving compromise and that the face to be saved would be Nasser's not Israel's ... Egyptian occupation of Sharm al-Sheikh and the blockade might be the reason to justify an attack, but Israel was also determined to deny Nasser his political triumph in the Arab world. ... With increased confidence in American acquiescence [acceptance], determined to punish Nasser and thwart the intent of Mohieddine's forthcoming visit to Washington, the cabinet on June 4 approved Dayan's plan to attack Egypt the next morning.

1. (a) What does Source A suggest about Nasser’s attitude towards the Palestinian question? *[3 marks]*
(b) What is the message conveyed by Source B? *[2 marks]*
 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and E about the 1967 crisis. *[6 marks]*
 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source D for historians studying the Arab–Israeli Six Day War (1967). *[6 marks]*
 4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, analyse the reasons behind the outbreak of the Arab–Israeli Six Day War (1967). *[8 marks]*
-